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We analyze whether the organizational structure of ﬁrms (i.e., whether a ﬁrm is diversiﬁed or
focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat ﬁrm level and segment-level data, we
ﬁnd that diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our
results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors
previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-
sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings
among diversiﬁed ﬁrms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments
of these ﬁrms and the availability of active internal capital markets. We ﬁnd that the other
theories that rely on the potentially effective use of asset sales of non-core segments of
diversiﬁed ﬁrms to generate cash, and the increased agency/inﬂuence costs in diversiﬁed ﬁrms
do not offer an economically signiﬁcant explanation for the lower cash holdings among
diversiﬁed ﬁrms.











Cash holding, an important asset on ﬁrms' balance sheets, receives much attention from companies, investors, and analysts.
Cash becomes especially important in recessions. The credit crunch that started in late 2007 has had a massive and sustained
impact on the way many companies operate throughout the world. Companies with sufﬁcient cash on hand may escape the need
to tap into the increasingly costly and restrictive credit markets. Determinants of cash holdings have long been debated in the
ﬁnance literature. Potential explanations range from the tradeoff between the marginal costs and beneﬁts of holding cash to
corporate governance.1 Our paper examines a previously ignored but important relationship between ﬁrm structure and cash
holdings. We show that diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly less cash than focused ﬁrms. The lower level of cash holdings among
diversiﬁed ﬁrms can be attributed to their access to internal capital markets, greater potential for asset sales, and higher agency
costs in diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
The investment opportunities of individual segments of diversiﬁed ﬁrms may be imperfectly correlated, which suggests a
possible role for internal capital market in these ﬁrms (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Khanna and Tice, 2001). If ﬁrms hold
cash for potential growth opportunities as in Opler et al. (1999) and to react to the underinvestment problem arising from
ﬁnancing related predation risk in imperfect product markets as in Haushalter et al. (2007), the imperfect correlation mentioned
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above implies that diversiﬁed ﬁrmswould need less cash on hand tomeet their investment demands at any one point in time. Also,
the availability of cash ﬂow from one segment as potential capital for another segment reduces diversiﬁed ﬁrms' need for external
capital and further reduces their beneﬁts of holding cash.
In addition, diversiﬁed ﬁrms are more likely to be able to raise funds by selling their assets than focused ﬁrms. Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) describe asset sales as a source of ﬁnancing. A ﬁrm with assets that can be cheaply converted into cash can raise
funds at a low cost by selling these assets. Therefore, given the size and breadth of assets owned, diversiﬁed ﬁrms aremore likely to
raise funds by selling substantial assets, especially the non-core segments, than single-segment ﬁrms, which in turn reduces the
need for cash holdings. Consequently, ﬁrms with more than one segment should have lower levels of cash holdings relative to
focused ﬁrms.
Lastly, diversiﬁed ﬁrms may face more severe agency problems that arise from segment-managers' intent to compete for ﬁrm-
wide resources (Rajan et al., 2000). Segments with more inﬂuence in the ﬁrm will receive more resources, which could lead to
over-investment and other dead-weight costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Bagwell and Zechner, 1993). Therefore, the marginal
costs of holding cash and liquid assets, which generate these agency costs, are higher for diversiﬁed ﬁrms than for focused ﬁrms.2
As a result, we would again expect diversiﬁed ﬁrms to hold less cash than focused ﬁrms in order to mitigate these agency costs.
Using Compustat data for U.S ﬁrms in the1988 to 2006 period, this paper ﬁnds that diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly less cash
than focused ﬁrms. This difference in cash holdings remains signiﬁcant even after controlling for industry at the segment level, and
other important determinants of cash holdings found in the literature. In addition, our paper shows that the presence of growth
opportunities that are imperfectly correlated across segments in the ﬁrm, the increased potential for asset sales (of non-core
assets), and the higher agency costs among diversiﬁed ﬁrms are all statistically signiﬁcantly related to their lower cash holdings.
However, we also ﬁnd that with additional robustness tests, the imperfect correlations in growth across segments and the cross-
segment ﬁnancing possibilities arising from internal capital markets emerge as the most consistent and economically signiﬁcant
explanations for the lower cash holdings among diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Our paper contributes to the cash holdings and the ﬁrm structure literatures in different and signiﬁcant ways. Opler et al.
(1999) provide a fundamental framework to study determinants of cash holdings and ﬁnd several inﬂuential factors that
determine cash holdings, including corporate growth prospects, short-termworking capital, leverage, industry volatility, and ﬁrm
size. Subsequent literature highlights the costs and beneﬁts of cash holdings related to corporate governance (e.g., Dittmar et al.,
2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Harford et al., 2008 among others), the predation risk in imperfect product
markets (Haushalter et al., 2007), ﬁnancial constraints (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010), and the ﬁnancing of corporate investments (e.g.,
Almeida et al., 2004). Dittmar et al. (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms in countries with poor protection of shareholder rights hold twice as
much cash as ﬁrms in countries with good protection of shareholder rights. They argue that the evidence is consistent with the
view that investors in countries with poor shareholder protection are unable to force managers to pay out the excess cash.
In a related vein, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that the value of cash is also much lower in poorly governed ﬁrms.
They show that in poorly governed ﬁrms, cash is dissipated in ways that signiﬁcantly reduce future operating performance.
Similarly, Harford et al. (2008) ﬁnd that in ﬁrms with high anti-takeover provisions (i.e., ﬁrms with poor shareholder rights), cash
is dissipated through value-destroying acquisitions. Consistent with this evidence, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) ﬁnd that when
external country-level governance is weak, although there is no general discount in value of high cash balance ﬁrms, there is a
valuation discount to high cash balance ﬁrms where the managers are also expected to be entrenched.3
Our ﬁrst signiﬁcant contribution is that we examine the importance of several, previously ignored, non-governance related
factors in explaining corporate cash holdings. We focus on organizational structure of ﬁrms by taking into account the cross-
segment correlations in investment opportunities, and agency and asset structure aspects that are unique to diversiﬁed ﬁrms. We
ﬁnd clear evidence that ﬁrm structure inﬂuences cash management strategy and a diversiﬁed ﬁrm structure lowers the optimal
level of cash holdings. As Harford et al. (2008) argue, unlike in international data, where there is substantial variation in the
protection of shareholder rights across countries, in the U.S., governance is fairly uniform. This lack of signiﬁcant variation in
governance regimes, especially between focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms, provides us with an opportunity to isolate the relative
importance of non-governance factors in determining cash holdings.
Second, this paper also contributes to the existing literature on ﬁrm structure—diversiﬁed versus focused ﬁrms, in two distinct
ways. First, our paper complements thework in Harford et al. (2003), Haushalter et al. (2007), Acharya et al. (2007), and Denis and
Sibilkov (2010) all of whom either directly or indirectly argue that cash acts as a hedge for ﬁrms against ﬁnancing and predation
risk, especially in downturns. We show that in this regard, a diversiﬁed ﬁrm structure in itself may be a natural hedge and may act
as a substitute for cash holding. In addition, prior papers, including Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998),
and Khanna and Tice (2001), study the effectiveness of internal capital markets within diversiﬁed ﬁrms. We extend previous work
on the efﬁcient allocation of ﬁrm resources from internal capital markets to include cash holdings. Our ﬁnding that ﬁrms with
higher inﬂuence costs have less cash holdings indicates that conglomerates respond to the higher agency costs by reducing their
cash holdings.
Third, this paper develops a methodology similar to that used in Berger and Ofek (1995) to control for the industry effects on
cash holdings, while previous literature uses industry dummy variables to control for the industry effects. More speciﬁcally, we use
2 Costs due to these principal–agent conﬂicts fall under the general rubric of inﬂuence costs in the corporate governance literature.
3 Faulkender and Wang (2006) also analyze the value that market places on cash holdings and how it varies cross-sectionally. In particular, they ﬁnd that the
marginal value of cash declines with large cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets, and as ﬁrms choose to distribute cash via dividends
rather than repurchases.
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the median cash holdings in the industry of each division to calculate imputed cash holdings and then use adjusted cash holdings
to measure the difference between diversiﬁed ﬁrms and focused ﬁrms. The measurement improvement is non-trivial because
diversiﬁed ﬁrms by deﬁnition operate in more than one industry, and so the (primary) industry dummy variable cannot fully
capture the industry effects and thereby leads to noisy estimates. By developing this methodology, we have a much improved
proxy for industry effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally discusses the theoretical framework used in this paper. This is
followed by a description of the data and empirical methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents empirical analyses of the effects of
ﬁrms' structure on their cash holdings. Section 5 reports results from various robustness checks, including different regression
speciﬁcations and with alternate variables and proxies. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical considerations
This paper follows the theoretical framework developed by Opler et al. (1999), which states that ﬁrms' optimal cash holdings
are determined by the tradeoff between the marginal costs and beneﬁts of holding liquid assets. The costs of holding cash include
opportunity costs of idle capital and agency costs associated with managerial discretion, whereas the beneﬁts of holding cash
include avoiding unnecessary transactions to borrow money and alleviating information asymmetry and agency costs associated
with external capital. Based on this simple intuition, we believe that ﬁrms' organizational structure could signiﬁcantly affect their
optimal cash holdings given there are different agency costs and ﬁnancing needs associated with diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms.
A multi-segment ﬁrm is not a simple combination of its segments. While segments are interdependent, their growth
opportunities are likely to be imperfectly correlated (Lamont, 1997, Shin and Stulz, 1998; Khanna and Tice, 2001). Consequently, if
ﬁrms hold cash for potential growth opportunities as argued in Opler et al. (1999), a diversiﬁed ﬁrm should need less cash to meet
its investment demand than a focused ﬁrm at any given point in time. Enhancing this effect, a diversiﬁed ﬁrm could also cross
ﬁnance one segment's investment projects with another segment's cash holdings. In short, complementary growth opportunities
at the segment level in diversiﬁed ﬁrms along with the availability of internal capital markets in these ﬁrms reduce the marginal
beneﬁts of holding liquid assets. This suggests that diversiﬁed ﬁrms should hold less cash than focused ﬁrms. We call this the
complementary growth hypothesis.
This hypothesis also has a connection to another thread in the cash holdings literature. Harford et al. (2003), Haushalter et al.
(2007), Acharya et al. (2007) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) all argue that cash acts as a hedge for ﬁrms against ﬁnancing and
predation risk, especially in downturns. The complementary growth hypothesis in effect examines whether the imperfect
correlation in growth opportunities and cash ﬂows across segments of a diversiﬁed ﬁrm act as natural hedge against the ﬁnancing
and predation risk discussed in the above papers, and whether a diversiﬁed ﬁrm structure may be a partial substitute for cash
holdings in this context.
Diversiﬁed ﬁrms are also more likely to sell their assets to raise funds than focused ﬁrms. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that
ﬁrms should have lower borrowing costs if they have more assets that can be cheaply and easily converted into cash. Given that
diversiﬁed ﬁrms are on average three times the size of focused ﬁrms, and they have assets from non-core segments, we expect
diversiﬁed ﬁrms aremore likely to raise funds by selling substantial assets, especially assets from non-core segments, than focused
ﬁrms. This again reduces the marginal beneﬁt of holding cash, which is a source of internal capital that does not incur the
information asymmetry related costs associated with external ﬁnancing. The greater likelihood of using asset sales as a ﬁnancing
channel suggests that diversiﬁed ﬁrms should have a lower need to hold cash. We refer to this as the asset sales hypothesis.
While the multi-segment ﬁrm structure does provide beneﬁts, it can also give rise to severe agency costs. Rajan et al. (2000)
show that diversiﬁed ﬁrms may face more severe agency problems that arise from segment-managers' propensity to lobby for
ﬁrm-wide resources. Segments with more inﬂuence in the ﬁrm will garner more resources, which could potentially lead to an
over-investment problem and other dead-weight costs (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Bagwell and Zechner, 1993). As a result,
the marginal costs of holding cash and liquid assets associated with these agency costs are higher for diversiﬁed ﬁrms than for
focused ﬁrms. Therefore, we again would expect diversiﬁed ﬁrms to hold less cash than focused ﬁrms in order to alleviate these
inﬂuence costs. We refer to this as the inﬂuence costs or agency costs hypothesis.
Fig. 1 illustrates how the optimal level of cash holdings can be affected by the ﬁrm structure via the three hypotheses. Fig. 1a
shows a downward sloping marginal beneﬁt curve of holding liquid assets and a horizontal marginal cost curve of holding liquid
assets, which follows Opler et al.'s (1999) assumption that costs of holding cash arise mainly from idle capital. The equilibrium for
the optimal cash holdings is the intersection of these two curves. According to our ﬁrst two hypotheses, the marginal beneﬁts of
holding cash could differ across ﬁrm structures. Both the complementary growth and the asset sales hypotheses suggest that
marginal beneﬁts of holding cash are less for diversiﬁed ﬁrms than for focused ﬁrms. Consequently, diversiﬁed ﬁrms' marginal
beneﬁt curve of holding cash should be to the left of focused ﬁrms' marginal beneﬁt curve, which suggests that the former has a
lower optimal level of liquid assets than the latter. The inﬂuence cost hypothesis on the other hand focuses on themarginal costs of
holding cash. Absent agency costs, there is no reason to believe that the marginal costs of holding cash are different for diversiﬁed
and focused ﬁrms. If agency problems related to inﬂuence costs are higher for diversiﬁed ﬁrms, one would then expect the
horizontal line representing the marginal costs of holding cash to move higher for diversiﬁed ﬁrms (as shown in Fig. 1b). Holding
the marginal beneﬁt curve constant, the shift in the marginal cost curve would cause the intersection between the marginal cost
curve and marginal beneﬁt curve for diversiﬁed ﬁrms to be to the left of the intersection for focused ﬁrms, which again predicts a
lower level of cash holdings for diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
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Fig. 1. Optimal holdings of liquid assets for diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms. Fig. 1a shows that the optimal amount of liquid assets is given by the intersection of the marginal cost curve and the marginal beneﬁt curve of holding
liquid assets. The marginal cost curve of holding liquid assets is non-decreasing whereas the marginal beneﬁt curve of holding liquid assets is decreasing (Opler et al., 1999). Due to complementary segment-level growth,
availability of internal capital markets, and the ability to effectively use asset sales to ﬁnance, diversiﬁed ﬁrms have lower marginal beneﬁts of holding cash, which implies their marginal beneﬁt curve of holding liquid assets
lies to the left of that for focused ﬁrms. Thus, A is the optimal amount of liquid asset holdings for focused ﬁrms and B is the optimal amount of liquid asset holdings for diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Fig. 1b assumes that the marginal
beneﬁt curve of holding liquid assets are the same for all ﬁrms whereas the marginal cost curve is different between diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms. Due to a higher agency problem (Rajan et al., 2000), diversiﬁed ﬁrms are
facing higher marginal costs of holding liquid assets. Again, A and B represent the optimal amount of liquid asset holdings for focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms, respectively. One could also combine both Fig. 1a and b, which















3. Data and methodology
We compile our sample using Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) annual data from 1988 to 2006. Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS)No. 14 requiresﬁrms to report information for segments that represent 10%ormoreof consolidated sales
for ﬁscal year ending after December 15, 1977.4 We start the sample period in 1988 rather than 1977 because Segment Industry
Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes are not available before 1988 fromCompustat. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as a diversiﬁed ﬁrm if it reportsmore than
one business segmentwith different SIC codes at the 2-digit level.5 Otherwise, it is classiﬁed as a focused ﬁrm. All of the following data
restrictions follow Berger and Ofek (1995). We exclude ﬁrms with any segment in a ﬁnancial industry (SIC 6000–6999), a utility
industry (SIC 4900–4999), and ﬁrms reporting negative segments sales or assets. The segment data are then merged with the
Compustat industry annual ﬁle to obtain ﬁrm level data. Firm-years with total assets less than ten million dollars are removed. If the
summation of segment sales ismore than 101% (or less than 99%) of the ﬁrm's total sales, or the summation of segment assets ismore
than 125% (or less than 75%) of the ﬁrm's total assets, we consider it either a data error or amismatch of the segment-level data to the
ﬁrm-level information, and sowe remove that data point. The ﬁnal sample in our study includes 52,277 focused ﬁrm-years and 7147
diversiﬁed ﬁrm-years. Our data include survivors and non-survivors that appear on Compustat at any time in the sample period.
Different industries have different levels of cash holdings (as ﬁrst illustrated in Chudson (1946)). Table 1 shows cash holdings for
each 2-digit SIC code industry. To avoid any ambiguity in the industry afﬁliation, we only include focused ﬁrms in this computation.
The top ten industries (panel B) hold as much as ten times more cash as a percentage of total assets than the bottom ten industries
(panel A). For example textile mill products, the industry with the lowest cash holdings, has a median (mean) of 1.46% (5.06%),
whereas chemicals and alliedproducts, the industrywith thehighest cashholdings, has amedian (mean)of 37.56% (41.70%). The large
industry variation for cash holdings indicates that controlling for the industry effects is crucial for the purpose of our analysis.
However, simply adding industry dummies to the regression explaining cash holdings is not appropriate for our analysis. This
paper examines the difference in cash holdings between diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms and the former by deﬁnition operates in
more than one industry; therefore, adding industry dummy variables could at best control for the industry speciﬁc effect of its
primary industry. As a result, this paper designs a new methodology, similar in spirit to the approach used in Berger and Ofek
(1995), to construct themain dependent variable—industry-adjusted cash holdings.We ﬁrst calculate themedian ratio of cash over
total assets (CASH/TA) for each industry based on the single-segment ﬁrms in that industry.6 We then deﬁne imputed cash
holdings, ImputedCash for each segment of a diversiﬁed ﬁrm, as the product of that segment's industry median (CASH/TA) and its
segment asset value. Lastly, adding up ImputedCash for each segment of a diversiﬁed ﬁrm gives us the ﬁrm-level ImputedCash.
This variable estimates a diversiﬁed ﬁrm's cash holdings had all its segments operated as stand-alone businesses. It rests on
segment accounting data and calculates the “imputed value” as a benchmark value for the conglomerate by adding up imputed
Table 1
Cash holdings by industry, 1988–2006. The table presents cash holding statistics across industries. The statistics are calculated using single-segment ﬁrms during
the period of 1988 to 2006 and the industry is deﬁned according to the 2-digit SIC code. Cash holdings are deﬁned as Cash/Assets, which is calculated as cash and
marketable securities (Compustat data item #1) divided by Assets (Compustat data item #6). Panel A shows the bottom 10 industries with the least cash holdings
and Panel B shows the top 10 industries with the most cash holdings. Only industries with more than 100 observations are included.
SIC Industry descriptions N Median Mean Std.
Panel A: Bottom 10 industries
2200 Textile mill products 415 1.46% 5.06% 8.48%
4200 Motor freight transportation and warehouse 534 2.35% 5.92% 9.52%
3300 Primary metal industries 860 2.63% 6.18% 9.51%
5500 Food store 250 2.63% 4.99% 5.93%
5000 Wholesale trade—durable goods 1578 2.75% 8.04% 12.95%
2600 Paper and allied products 531 2.84% 6.71% 9.65%
2500 Furniture and ﬁxtures 344 2.85% 7.41% 10.29%
5300 General merchandise stores 541 3.29% 6.45% 7.62%
3000 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 629 3.36% 7.55% 9.76%
2000 Food and kindred products 1419 3.49% 9.07% 12.91%
Panel B. Top 10 industries
4700 Transportation services 140 12.22% 20.15% 21.90%
4500 Transportation by air 556 12.50% 15.71% 12.94%
9900 Nonclassiﬁable establishment 307 12.66% 24.04% 27.67%
3500 Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 4078 15.89% 22.55% 21.39%
8700 Engineering, accounting, research and management 1047 16.75% 26.81% 26.40%
3600 Electronic (except computer equipment) 5294 18.20% 24.49% 22.50%
3800 Measuring instruments; photographic, watches and clocks 4103 20.00% 27.10% 25.07%
8200 Educational services 164 21.14% 27.83% 20.64%
7300 Business services 7587 30.74% 33.86% 25.27%
2800 Chemicals and allied products 5039 37.56% 41.70% 32.69%
4 SFAS14 was replaced by SFAS131 in 1997, which requires ﬁrms to disclose more segment information.
5 If a ﬁrm reports two or more segments that are all in the same industry, we regard the ﬁrm as a focused ﬁrm.
6 The industry median ratios are based on 2-digit SIC code that includes at least ten single-line businesses.
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segment values. Our main dependent variable is the difference between the actual cash holdings of the diversiﬁed ﬁrm and the
ImputedCash, scaled by total assets of the ﬁrm. We call this variable ADJCASH in all the regressions. Positive ADJCASH indicates
that the diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold more cash than their stand-alone counterparts and negative ADJCASH indicates that diversiﬁed
ﬁrms hold less cash compared with the stand-alone counterparts. For single-segment ﬁrms, we do the same calculation and the
ADJCASH is again deﬁned as (Cash− ImputedCash)/TA. Since we use the single-segment ﬁrms as benchmark to calculate the
ADJCASH for the focused ﬁrms, the median ADJCASH for all the focused ﬁrms should be zero. The methodology of using the
ADJCASH variable effectively controls for any industry effects in our analysis.
This method of computing imputed cash holdings adjusted for industry afﬁliation is not without its limitations though. The
industry adjustment inherent in this construction assumes that focused (stand-alone) ﬁrms in the industry are comparable to
segments of diversiﬁed ﬁrms that operate in the same business line. Amajor point of our paper is that stand-alone ﬁrms are not the
same as segments of a diversiﬁed ﬁrm as far as cash needs go, at least due to the three theories we discuss. But there may be other
latent and systematic differences as well (see Graham et al., 2002; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Hyland and Diltz, 2002; Villalonga,
2004) such as how a diversiﬁed ﬁrm came to be diversiﬁed (e.g., poorly performing single-segment ﬁrms were acquired to form
diversiﬁed ﬁrms). In this study's context, it's possible that diversiﬁed ﬁrms were formed when ﬁnancially constrained single-
segment ﬁrms were bought off by larger and ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. We deal with the possible endogeneity problem two
different ways. First, in addition to ADJCASHwe also use the unadjusted, Cash to Total Assets ratio, alongwith the primary industry
dummy variable as a control variable in the regressions to control for the industry afﬁliation of the diversiﬁed ﬁrms. The empirical
results indicate that the inferences are all unchanged. However, as pointed out before, since diversiﬁed ﬁrms by deﬁnition operate
in more than one industry, the primary industry control can at best only be a partial control for industry afﬁliation. Second, we also
use a comprehensive set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables in all the regressions based on the prior literature on cash holdings, such
as investment expenditures, R&D, bond rating, proﬁtability, leverage, etc. to catch any other systematic differences between stand-
alone ﬁrms and diversiﬁed ﬁrms that are not captured by the three theories we present in this paper.
Our hypotheses require us to measure three sets of important independent variables. The ﬁrst group measures the degree to
which growth opportunities among segments complement each other and the actual level of internal capital market activity in
diversiﬁed ﬁrms. The second captures the frequency of using asset sales as a ﬁnancing method, and the effectiveness of such asset
sales. The last measures agency and inﬂuence costs in ﬁrms.
The degree of complementarity in growth opportunities among segments is measured using the mean of the time-series
correlation between segments' growth opportunities. We follow the existing literature to proxy each segment's growth
opportunity by using the median market-to-book ratio of focused ﬁrms in that segment's industry. For every two segments in the
diversiﬁed ﬁrm, we calculate the correlation between their growth opportunities during the sample period. We then compute
the mean of the correlations (MEANQCOR) for each two-segment combination. All focused ﬁrms have MEANQCOR equal to one.
The higher the MEANQCOR, the higher is the correlation between segments' growth opportunities, and therefore, fewer are the
complementary effects within the ﬁrm. According to the complementary growth hypothesis, as MEANQCOR increases it increases
the beneﬁts of holding cash, and thereby the optimal level of cash holdings. So, MEANQCOR is predicted to be positively related to
cash holdings. This is our main variable for the complementary growth hypothesis.
We also measure the difference in growth opportunities across segments using another, possibly more direct, measure,
DIVERSITY. This measure was ﬁrst developed by Rajan et al. (2000), and is also subsequently used in papers such as Billett and
Mauer (2003). To measure the difference in growth opportunities among segments, DIVERSITY is deﬁned as the standard
deviation of the segment asset-weighted Tobin's Q (TobinsQ) of the ﬁrm divided by the mean Tobin's Q of all segments in the
ﬁrm.7 The higher the DIVERSITY, the larger are complementarities in growth opportunities. So, the complementary growth
hypothesis predicts that DIVERSITY will be negatively related to cash holdings.
The complementary growth in segments only suggests the possibility that diversiﬁed ﬁrms can have less cash holdings tomeet the
growth needs. But it assumes that there is free ﬂow of funds across segments of diversiﬁed ﬁrms. So, a related condition for the
complementary growth hypothesis is that the ﬁrms do actually allocate cash among different segments. Following Berger and Hann
(2003), we use the variable MINTER to directly measure the ﬂow of funds within the ﬁrm. For each year, we ﬁrst calculate the excess
capital expenditure over its own cash ﬂows for each segment, i.e. Excess CAPX=Max [CAPX−(OPS+DEP), 0], where CAPX= capital
expenditure,OPS=operatingproﬁts, DEP=depreciationexpense. All variables aredeﬂatedby total assets.Whena segmenthascapital
expenditures larger than its own operating cash ﬂow, then the segmentmay be receiving ﬁnancing inﬂows from other segments. Since
some of this excess capital expendituresmay be ﬁnancedwith external ﬁnancing sources or from past year cash ﬂows as well (and not
through internal capitalmarket activity), we have to control for ﬁrm level ﬁnancing and investment effects. So, to isolate inter-segment
cash ﬂow transfers, we adjust for the ﬁrm level excess capital expenditure, and deﬁne the variable Transfer as the Max (sum of excess
CAPX−Firm level excess CAPX, 0), where the sum of excess CAPX is over all the segments of the ﬁrm. MINTER is then deﬁned as the
mean of Transfer during the sample period. It measures the average internal cash ﬂows across divisions in diversiﬁed ﬁrms. For focused
ﬁrms,MINTER is equal to 0. The complementary growth hypothesis predicts thatMINTER should be negatively related to cash holdings.
We construct three variables to measure the possibility, use, and effectiveness of asset sales. MSALEPPE measures how often
the ﬁrm sells property, plant and equipment. For a ﬁrm-year, if the sale of property, plant and equipment is bigger than zero
(Compustat data item 107), we let Dumsaleppe=1, else Dumsaleppe=0. The asset sales hypothesis suggests that asset sales can
be used in lieu of external ﬁnancing. It however does not mean that in the year that a ﬁrm sells assets, it has less cash holdings.8
7 Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value and book value of the ﬁrm.
8 Actually the opposite may be true. When a ﬁrm sells assets, it may receive a large amount of cash and increase the cash holdings temporarily.
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Therefore, we take the average of Dumsaleppe during the sample period and name it MSALEPPE. If asset sales frequently serve as
an alternate method of ﬁnancing, such ﬁrms would have less need for cash holdings. The asset sales hypothesis predicts that
MSALEPPE will be negatively related to cash holdings. We also use LOSSASSET to measure the effectiveness of asset sales.
MSALEPPE can only indirectly measure the effectiveness of asset sales. If a ﬁrm effectively uses asset sales as an external ﬁnancing
method, it should earn a proﬁt or at least sell the assets at relatively low discounts. For a ﬁrm-year, if the loss from asset sales
(Compustat data item 213) is larger than zero, we let DuMLOSSA=1, else DuMLOSSA=0.We then take the average of DuMLOSSA
during the sample period and name it MLOSSA. MLOSSA indicates how often a ﬁrm has losses when it sells its PPE and Investment.
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions. The table describes the deﬁnition of variables used in the paper.
Variable name Deﬁnition Compustat data item
Cash holdings Cash/Asset Data1/Data6









Segment data item at and Compustat Data 1
ADJCASH (Cash− ImputedCash)/Asset (Data1− ImputedCash)/Data6
Size Natural log of Asset Data6
Growth opportunity
(market to book value
or TobinsQ)
Market value of the ﬁrm (book value of asset less the book value of the equity,
plus the market value of the equity), divided by book value of the assets
(Data6−Data60-Data74+Data199⁎Data25)/
Data6
Total leverage Total debt over total assets Data181/Data6
Cash ﬂow Earnings before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and amortization divided
by assets
(Data14+Data18)/Data 6
Net working capital Working capital, less cash, divided by assets (Data179−Data1)/Data6
Invest Capital expenditure divided by assets Data128/Data6
R&D Research and development spending over sales Data46/Data12
DiversiﬁcationDummy 1 for ﬁrms operating in more than one segment and 0 otherwise Segment data
DivDum 1 if the ﬁrms pay dividend in that year and 0 otherwise Data21 and Data19
Bonddum 1 if ﬁrms debt has an investment grade rating (bbb or higher), 0 if otherwise Data280 (bond rating)
FirmSigma FirmSigma is a measure of the volatility of a ﬁrm's cash ﬂow over the time
period. It is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash ﬂow over assets.
(Data14+Data18)/Data 6
MEANQCOR Mean of correlations between segments' growth opportunities. For each
industry (deﬁned as 2-digit sic), we ﬁrst get the median of TobinsQ in each year
during the sample period. A correlation between every two industries is then
calculated. This correlation can measure how growth opportunities vary
together for these two industries. MEANQCOR is deﬁned as the mean of the
correlations between every two segments. Focused ﬁrms have MEANQCOR
equal to 1.
DIVERSITY DIVERSITY means the diversity of growth opportunities between segments.
Following Rajan et al. (2000), this variable is calculated as the standard deviation
of segment asset-weighted TobinsQ's for the ﬁrm divided by the equally
weighted average TobinsQ of segments in the ﬁrm.
MINTER MINTER is a direct measurement of internal capital market. It follows Berger and
Hann (2003). For every year, we calculate Transfer as Max(sum of excess CAPX-
ﬁrm level excess CAPX, 0), where excess CAPX=Max(CAPX−(OPS+DEP), 0),
CAPX = capital expenditure, OPS = operating proﬁts, DEP = depreciation
expense. All variables are deﬂated by total assets. MINTER is the mean of
Transfer during the sample period.
CAPX, OPS, DEP in segment data
MSALEPPE For a ﬁrm-year, Dumsaleppe=1 if data107N0 and 0 otherwise. MSALEPPE is
deﬁned as the mean of Dumsaleppe during the sample period and it indicates
how often the ﬁrm sells Property, Plant and Equipment.
Data107(sale of property, plant and equipment)
MLOSSA For a ﬁrm-year, DuMLOSSA=1 if data213N0 and 0 otherwise. MLOSSA is
deﬁned as the mean of DuMLOSSA during the sample period and it indicates
how often the ﬁrm loses when sell PPE and Investment
Data213(sale of PPE and Invest−Loss(Gain))
SDP For a diversiﬁed ﬁrm, we ﬁrst calculate DP as depreciation expense divided by
sales for each segment. SDP is deﬁned as DP of the non-core segment (the one
with the least sales) minus the average DP of all the segments in the ﬁrm. For
focused ﬁrms, SDP is 0. For each ﬁrm, SDP indicates the level of illiquid assets in
the non-core segment of the ﬁrm.
DEP, SALES in segment data
INEFFI INEFFI is a measure of potential over-investment caused by agency problem. For
every industry (deﬁned by DNUM) and year, we calculate the mean TobinsQ. If
in that year, a ﬁrm's TobinsQ is lower than the mean of the industry,
DlowTobinsQ is 1 and 0 otherwise. DlowTobinsQ is a dummy variable that
indicates whether a ﬁrm is operating below the industry TobinsQ. INEFFI is
deﬁned as the interaction term beween DlowTobinsQ and ﬁrm's investments,
INEFFI=DlowTobinsQ⁎Invest.
Invest = Data128/Data6
CGINDEX Is the corporate governance index (G-Index) computed by Gompers et al.
(2003). It is based on 24 governance factors from the corporate charter
provisions within the ﬁrm that are counter to shareholder interests.
G-Index originally computed based on data
provided by Investor Responsibility Research
center.
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The higher the MLOSSA, the less effectively asset sales serve as an alternate ﬁnancing channel. The asset sales hypothesis predicts
thatMLOSSAwill be positively related to cash holdings.MSALEPPE andMLOSSA are our twomain variables for the asset sales hypothesis.
As a third variable in this regard, we estimate the level of illiquid assets (assets not part of the current assets) in the non-core
segments of diversiﬁed ﬁrms to examinewhether that is positively related to the ﬁrm's cash holdings. Since segment data does not
provide a breakup of the segment-level asset structure, such as segment-level plant property and equipment, we use segment-
level depreciation expenses to estimate this variable. For each segment we compute the ratio of depreciation expenses to sales
(DP). We identify the non-core segment of a diversiﬁed ﬁrm as the segment with the least sales. We then compute our main
variable, standardized depreciation expense (SDP), as the DP of the non-core segment minus the average DP of all the segments in
the ﬁrm. By deﬁnition, the SDP of focused ﬁrms would be zero. The asset sales hypothesis argues that higher is the SDP, the higher
are the illiquid assets in the non-core segment and so higher should be the cash holdings of the ﬁrm.
Tomeasure the severity of inﬂuence costs and agency costs within a ﬁrm, we rely on two very different metrics. Our ﬁrst metric is an
indirect measure that draws from the observed investment efﬁciencies within a ﬁrm. We use the variable INEFFI, which measures the
potential over-investment by ﬁrms. For every industry and year, we calculate the median TobinsQ. In a given year, if a ﬁrm's TobinsQ is
lower than the industry's median, DlowTobinsQ is set to one, and is set to zero otherwise. DlowTobinsQ is used to indicate whether the
ﬁrmhas fewer growth opportunities as compared to the industrymedian. INEFFI is deﬁned as the interaction betweenDlowTobinsQ and
the investment level of theﬁrm, i.e. INEFFI=DlowTobinsQ⁎Invest. Firmswith larger INEFFI have investedmore in a lowgrowth area, and
we use this variable to measure the potential over-investment caused by agency problems. Our inﬂuence costs hypothesis predicts that
INEFFI is negatively related to cash holdings. This is our main variable for the agency/inﬂuence cost hypothesis.
The secondmeasure of agency costs is the corporate governance index developed by Gompers et al. (2003). We label the index
CGINDEX for the empirical tests in our paper. For each ﬁrm, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick use 24 different governance rules within
the ﬁrm that run counter to shareholder interests to compute the index. The higher the index, the higher are the hurdles to good
governance, and soweaker is the governance in the ﬁrm.We borrow this variable from their paper. Since governance provisions in
any given ﬁrm are presumably not changing much from year to year, Gompers et al. (2003) recompute the index only about every
other year. Within our sample period, 1988–2006, CGINDEX is computed for the years 1990, '93, '95, '98, '00, '02, '04, and '06. The
agency hypothesis argues that ﬁrms with higher agency problems (poorly governed ﬁrms), i.e., ﬁrms with a higher CGINDEX
would have higher costs of holding cash and so would have lower cash holdings.
Variables used to control for other determinants of cash holdings follow Opler et al. (1999). The main determinants of cash
holdings that they identify are industry, market-to-book ratio, size, cash ﬂow, net working capital imbalance, investment, leverage,
R&D and dividend. Since we control for industry effect at the segment level when we construct our main dependant variable
ADJCASH, we do not include industry dummies or industry cash ﬂow volatility in our regressions. We include all the other control
variables. The market-to-book ratio measures the likelihood that a ﬁrm is expected to have positive net present value projects in
the future. The higher the market-to-book ratio, the higher are the growth options in the ﬁrm. Size is calculated as the natural
logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash ﬂow is deﬁned as earnings after interest, dividend, and taxes, but before depreciation
and amortization, divided by total assets. Firms may choose to insure themselves against losses by holding liquid assets besides
Table 3
Firm Characteristics by Organization Structure, 1988–2006. The table compares ﬁrm characteristics between focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms. The sample includes
52,277 observations for focused ﬁrms and 7147 observations for diversiﬁed ﬁrms during the period of 1988 to 2006. For variable CGINDEX, there are 9099
observations for focused ﬁrms and 2517 observations for diversiﬁed ﬁrms. The focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms are identiﬁed by their SIC code. The deﬁnitions of
these variables are shown in Table II. All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1% level.
Variable
names
Focused ﬁrms Diversiﬁed ﬁrms T-Stat for difference in means
Mean Median Mean Median
NSEG 1.000 1.000 2.385 2.000 −510.4
CashHoldings 0.205 0.105 0.068 0.036 48.88
ADJCASH 0.048 0.000 −0.038 −0.032 35.65
Asset 797 100 2359 360 −28.93
Size 4.853 4.615 5.953 5.888 −51.86
Leverage 0.480 0.452 0.584 0.574 −30.16
TobinsQ 2.105 1.515 1.514 1.272 28.84
R&D 0.308 0.000 0.021 0.000 17.6
Invest 0.069 0.045 0.059 0.048 10.76
Wcapital 0.089 0.075 0.135 0.126 −17.94
Cashﬂow 0.009 0.072 0.064 0.084 −20.19
Divdum 0.323 0.000 0.607 1.000 −47.86
Bonddum 0.047 0.000 0.200 0.000 −49.9
FirmSigma 0.125 0.071 0.066 0.041 33.59
MEANQCOR 1.000 1.000 0.467 0.502 432.85
DIVERSITY 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.319 −403.2
MINTER 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.003 −154.59
MSALEPPE 0.367 0.250 0.452 0.375 −17.95
MLOSSA 0.230 0.154 0.201 0.111 8.96
SDP 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.004 −97.31
INEFFI 0.040 0.016 0.037 0.024 4.10
CGINDEX 8.562 8.000 10.068 10.000 −25.80
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cash and some ﬁrms liquidate receivables as a means of raising cash, so we use working capital minus cash as a measure of liquid
asset substitutes. The investment of the ﬁrm is measured by capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated by
using the debt-to-assets ratio deﬁned as the sum of (long-term debt+short-term debt) divided by total assets. We use the R&D
expense-to-sales ratio to proxy for potential ﬁnancial distress costs. A dividend dummy variable is set to one in the year where a
ﬁrm pays a dividend and zero otherwise. Deﬁnitions of all the variables are summarized in Table 2.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms and the difference in the various characteristics
between the two groups. First, diversiﬁed ﬁrms have median (mean) cash holdings of 3.6% (6.8%) of their assets, which is only
about one third of the cash holdings for focused ﬁrms, whose median (mean) is 10.5% (20.5%). The median ADJCASH for focused
ﬁrms is 0 as we expect because ADJCASH is measured with respect to focused ﬁrms. The median (mean) ADJCASH is −3.2%
(−3.8%) for diversiﬁed ﬁrms, which implies that diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold less cash not only when cash is measured as a percentage of
assets but also after we control for industry afﬁliation at the segment level. Diversiﬁed ﬁrms in our sample on average are
operating in two industries. Diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms differ in possible determinants of cash holdings as well. For example,
diversiﬁed ﬁrms are larger than focused ﬁrms in general (median size of $100 million of assets for focused ﬁrms versus $360
million for diversiﬁed ﬁrms) and diversiﬁed ﬁrms have better bond ratings than focused ﬁrms. Given Opler et al. (1999) ﬁnd that
ﬁrm size and bond ratings are important determinants for cash holdings, the difference in these factors between diversiﬁed and
focused ﬁrms can lead to different levels of cash holdings. So, in subsequent tests we control for these and other factors found to be
relevant in Opler et al. (1999) to examine whether diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold less cash than focused ﬁrms even after these controls.
Finally, we also observe that there are signiﬁcant differences between diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms in their propensity for and
efﬁciency in generating funds through asset sales. The averageMSALEPPE is 0.452 for diversiﬁed ﬁrms and 0.367 for focused ﬁrms,
suggesting that diversiﬁed ﬁrms indeed use asset sales more often than focused ﬁrms. This is consistent with the notion that
diversiﬁed ﬁrms are more likely to sell their non-core segment assets. MLOSSA is 0.201 for diversiﬁed ﬁrms and 0.230 for focused
ﬁrms, suggesting that diversiﬁed ﬁrms sell assets in a more effective way (i.e., at smaller discounts). The preliminary evidence is
consistent with the asset sales hypothesis. Also, consistent with the agency cost hypothesis, we ﬁnd that diversiﬁed ﬁrms have
weaker governance on average (median CGINDEX of 10 in diversiﬁed ﬁrms versus 8 for focused ﬁrms).
4.2. Regression evidence
In this section we examine whether diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold less cash once we control for the previously found determinants of
cash holdings in a multiple regression setting. We also test the three proposed hypotheses on the relationship between ﬁrm
structure and cash holdings.
Table 4 presents the regressions with ADJCASH as the dependent variable. Regression 1 in Table 4 quantiﬁes the effect of ﬁrm
structure on cash holdings by including all the cash determinants suggested by Opler et al. (1999) as well as a dummy variable for
ﬁrm structure (divers-dummy), which is one for a diversiﬁed ﬁrm and zero for a focused ﬁrm, in a multivariate regression (with
ﬁxed year effects). It shows that the effect of ﬁrm structure is both economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold
signiﬁcantly less cash than focused ﬁrms even after controlling for all the previously established determinants of cash holdings
such as size, leverage, market to book ratio, R&D expense, capital expenditure, net working capital, earnings, dividend, credit
rating, and cash ﬂow volatility. The variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of signiﬁcance. The coefﬁcients on the control
variables are consistent with those found in Opler et al. (1999).
In order to further evaluate thematerial impact of a diversiﬁedﬁrm structure on cash holdingswe study the economic signiﬁcance
of the variable in addition to the statistical signiﬁcance reported above. To examine economic signiﬁcancewe use the coefﬁcient of the
variable from Regression 1 of Table 4 and the means of this variable and the means of the dependent variable (ADJCASH) in the
focused- and diversiﬁed-ﬁrms sub-samples, from Table 3. The regression coefﬁcient indicates that aswemove from the focused to the
diversiﬁed ﬁrms, there is a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in ADJCASH. But is the drop in ADJCASH attributable to this variable
economically signiﬁcant? FromRegression 1 of Table 4, the coefﬁcient of divers-dummy,−0.019,which indicates thatwhenwemove
from the average value of divers-dummy of 0 among focused ﬁrms to the value of 1 among diversiﬁed ﬁrms, ADJCASH drops
by −0.019⁎(0−1)=0.019. This represents a sizable (22%) part of the change in the mean of ADJCASH, which goes from 0.048
to−0.038. That is,−0.019 is 22% of the 0.086 change in the mean of ADJCASH going from the focused to diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
The complementary growth hypothesis predicts that the higher are the complementarities in growth opportunities, the lower
are the cash holdings. We measure the complementary growth and the internal capital markets activity with the average of
correlations between segment growths (MEANQCOR), and the differences in growth opportunities across segments in a ﬁrm
(DIVERSITY), and inter-segment transfer of funds (MINTER). Regression 2 in Table 4 shows that cash holdings are signiﬁcantly
positively related to MEANQCOR. This is consistent with the complementary growth hypothesis as higher MEANQCOR indicates
lower complementarities in growth. Also, DIVERSITY has a negative coefﬁcient (Regression 3 of Table 4) that is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, which indicates that as complementarities increase cash holdings decrease. The effect of MINTER on cash is less clear as its
coefﬁcient (Regression 4 of Table 4) fails marginally to be statistically signiﬁcant.
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Regression 5 of Table 4 tests the asset sales hypothesis using MSALEPPE and MLOSSA, which measure the frequency and
effectiveness of selling ﬁxed assets, respectively. The coefﬁcient ofMSALEPPE is−0.004with a t-statistic indicating signiﬁcance at the
5% level of signiﬁcance and the coefﬁcient of MLOSSA is 0.008 with a t-statistic signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The regression results are
consistentwith the view that ﬁrms that engage inmore asset sales and those that have fewer losses fromasset sales have lower levels
of cash holdings because these ﬁrms are able to use asset sales as an efﬁcient form of ﬁnancing. This evidence is consistent with the
asset sales hypothesis. In addition, Regression 6 shows that SDP is positively and statistically signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrms' cash
holdings, consistent with the view that ﬁrms' whose non-core segment's assets cannot be easily converted to cash hold more cash.
To test the agency cost hypothesis,weﬁrst use INEFFI tomeasure the level of inefﬁcient investment in theﬁrmand thus indirectly infer
the levelof agencyproblemswithin theﬁrm.The larger is this variable, thehigher are theagencycosts, andconsequently, the lower should
be the cashholdings. Regression 7 in Table 4 shows that the effect of this variable on cash is signiﬁcantly negative. The coefﬁcient of INEFFI
is−0.075 with a t-statistic of−5.74, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of signiﬁcance. The results indicate that ﬁrms with
higher agency costs tend to hold less cash,which is consistentwith the inﬂuence costs hypothesis. This evidence also rejects the potential
alternativehypothesiswhere cashholdings areexpected tobepositively correlatedwithmeasuresof inﬂuence costs (aswouldbe thecase
if cash holdings are the cause of rather than the response to agency costs in diversiﬁed ﬁrms.)9 Our second proxy for agency problems,
CGINDEX, also yields similar results. Regression 8 in Table 4 shows that higher is the CGINDEX (i.e., weaker is the governance in theﬁrm),
lower are the cash holdings, which is consistent with the view that when agency costs go up, the cash level goes down.
Table 4
Effects of ﬁrm structure on cash holdings, 1988–2006. This table reports various regression results with industry-adjusted cash holdings as the dependent variable.
The industry-adjusted cash holdings are calculated as cash minus imputed cash divided by total assets. Imputed cash holdings are the sum of the segment assets









. Firm structure is represented using a dummy variable, which is 1 if the ﬁrm is
diversiﬁed and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are deﬁned in Table 2. Intercepts and year dummies are included but omitted from the table. T-statistics are
reported in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Independent variable Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression (5)
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(2.93)*** (3.04)*** (2.91)*** (3.02)*** (3.14)***
Leverage −0.297 −0.297 −0.297 −0.297 −0.296
(−109.28)*** (−109.37)*** (−109.38)*** (−109.28)*** (−108.71)***
TobinsQ 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(35.18)*** (35.23)*** (35.22)*** (35.21)*** (34.84)***
R&D 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
(31.71)*** (31.68)*** (31.67)*** (31.70)*** (31.76)***
Invest −0.293 −0.293 −0.292 −0.293 −0.290
(−30.38)*** (−30.40)*** (−30.31)*** (−30.39)*** (−29.93)***
Wcapital −0.288 −0.289 −0.288 −0.288 −0.288
(−76.45)*** (−76.62)*** (−76.54)*** (−76.47)*** (−76.26)***
Cashﬂow −0.027 −0.027 −0.027 −0.027 −0.027
(−6.60)*** (−6.57)*** (−6.61)*** (−6.64)*** (−6.52)***
Divdum −0.020 −0.020 −0.020 −0.020 −0.019
(−13.21)*** (−13.37)*** (−13.24)*** (−13.23)*** (−12.95)***
Bonddum −0.051 −0.051 −0.051 −0.051 −0.051
(−16.61)*** (−16.64)*** (−16.71)*** (−16.59)*** (−16.49)***
Firmsigma 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039
(6.94)*** (6.94)*** (6.94)*** (6.94)*** (6.74)***
Divers-dummy −0.019 0.000 0.001 −0.021 −0.019











N 59,424 59,424 59,424 59,424 59,424
Adj. R2 32.59% 32.62% 32.63% 32.59% 32.60%
9 The key argument in the inﬂuence cost hypothesis is that diversiﬁedﬁrms take effective actions to reduce their cashholdings in order to avoidﬁghts over resource due to
empirebuilding. Toaddress thequestionofwhether lower cashholdings andagencyproblemscanco-exist (i.e., should lower cashholdings fully solve theagencyproblems?),
weexamine time-series changes in the twovariables. In resultsnot reported in the tables,weﬁnd that changes in INEFFI are signiﬁcantlynegatively correlatedwith changes in
ADJCASH. This suggests that consistent with our hypothesis, increased agency/inﬂuence costs are met with decreases in cash holdings.
768 V. Subramaniam et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2011) 759–773
Lastly, we include the main proxies for all three hypotheses into the same regression simultaneously (Regressions 9 and 10 of
Table 4) to test whether they are three independent explanations. The results are the same as in the regressions when they are
added independently: MEANQCOR, MSALEPPE, MLOSSA, INEFFI, and CGINDEX are all statistically signiﬁcant as predicted and with
the expected sign.10 Both regression results also indicate an important observation: once the proxies that capture the effects
predicted by our three hypotheses are included, the ﬁrm structure dummy becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. This suggests that
complementary growth, asset sales, and agency costs are the main characteristics that cause diversiﬁed ﬁrms to have less cash
holdings than focused ﬁrms. When these three factors are controlled for, diversiﬁed ﬁrms do not signiﬁcantly differ from focused
ﬁrms in their cash holdings.
Inorder to further evaluate thematerial impact of these variables oncashholdings and tounderstand the relative importanceof the
three hypotheses, we study the economic signiﬁcance of these variables along the lines mentioned earlier in this section. To examine
economic signiﬁcance we use the coefﬁcients of the variables in Table 4 (mainly Regression 9) and the means of the explanatory
variables and the means of the dependent variable ADJCASH in the focused- and diversiﬁed-ﬁrms sub-samples, seen from Table 3.
Regression 9 of Table 4 indicates that the coefﬁcient of MEANQCOR, 0.036, which indicates that when we move from the average
MEANQCOR of 1 among focused ﬁrms to amean of 0.467 among diversiﬁed ﬁrms, ADJCASH drops by 0.036⁎(1−0.467)=0.019. This
10 We also ran an 11th regression, not reported in Table 4, that included all the independent variables simultaneously (not just the main ones for each theory),
and all of the variables, except MINTER, were statistically signiﬁcant and with the expected sign. MINTER had the expected sign, but continued to be marginally
insigniﬁcant.
Independent variable Regression (6) Regression (7) Regression (8) Regression (9) Regression (10)
Size 0.001 0.001 −0.009 0.002 −0.008
(2.88)*** (2.98)*** (−6.17)*** (3.31)*** (−5.59)***
Leverage −0.297 −0.297 −0.234 −0.297 −0.234
(−109.25)*** (−109.44)*** (−33.97)*** (−108.94)*** (−33.97)***
TobinsQ 0.015 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.005
(35.17)*** (31.18)*** (4.79)*** (30.93)*** (4.98)***
R&D 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.014
(31.72)*** (31.85)*** (6.99)*** (31.88)*** (7.15)***
Invest −0.293 −0.250 −0.226 −0.248 −0.233
(−30.39)*** (−20.57)*** (−9.27)*** (−20.3)*** (−9.48)***
Wcapital −0.288 −0.289 −0.292 −0.289 −0.295
(−76.36)*** (−76.62)*** (−29.93)*** (−76.59)*** (−29.99)***
Cashﬂow −0.027 −0.028 −0.027 −0.027 −0.028
(−6.59)*** (−6.78)*** (−2.01)** (−6.66)*** (−2.09)**
Divdum −0.020 −0.020 −0.012 −0.020 −0.013
(−13.19)*** (−13.4)*** (−3.96)*** (−13.29)*** (−4.18)***
Bonddum −0.051 −0.051 −0.035 −0.051 −0.034
(−16.59)*** (−16.76)*** (−8.42)*** (−16.67)*** (−8.29)***
Firmsigma 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.038
(6.93)*** (6.99)*** (2.13)** (6.78)*** (2.06)**
Divers-Dummy −0.021 −0.019 −0.013 0.001 0.003













N 59,424 59,424 11,616 59,424 11,616
Adj. R2 32.59% 32.63% 24.40% 32.67% 24.56%
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represents a very sizable 22%of the change in themeanofADJCASH,whichgoes from0.048 to−0.038. That is, 0.019 is 22%of the0.086
change in the mean of ADJCASH going from the focused to diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
A larger level of economic signiﬁcance may be seen in the DIVERSITY variable (Regression 3 of Table 4). The coefﬁcient of
DIVERSITY, −0.059, indicates that when we move from the average DIVERSITY of 0 among focused ﬁrms to 0.335 among
diversiﬁed ﬁrms, ADJCASH drops by −0.059⁎(0−0.335)=0.02. This is 23% of the 0.086 change in the mean of ADJCASH going
from the focused to diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Whenwe perform a similar analysis on the other variables, MSALEPPE, MLOSSA, INEFFI (Regression 9), SDP (Regression 6), and
CGINDEX (Regression 10) which serve as tests of the asset sales and the agency/inﬂuence costs hypotheses, we ﬁnd very different
results. The coefﬁcient of MSALEPPE,−0.004 indicates that when we move from the average MSALEPPE of 0.366 among focused
ﬁrms to 0.443 among diversiﬁed ﬁrms, ADJCASH drops by −0.004⁎(0.367−0.452)=0.00034. This is less than 1% of the 0.086
change in the mean of ADJCASH going from the focused to diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Similarly weak economic explanatory power of well
below 1%may be seen in theMLOSSA, SDP, and INEFFI variables as well. Only CGINDEX fairs a little better with an economic impact
of about 8.7%. These results suggest that although all three hypotheses, complementary growth, asset sales, and agency/inﬂuence
costs hypotheses are statistically signiﬁcant, only the complementary growth hypothesis is economically signiﬁcant in explaining
the difference in cash holdings across focused and diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Perhaps more importantly, once we include the variables measuring complementarities in growth across segments, divers-
dummy is no longer economically signiﬁcant. Its coefﬁcient of 0.001 in Regression 9 of Table 4 indicates that it explains less than
1% of the change in ADJCASH. That is, 0.001⁎(0−1)=−0.001, which is less than 1% of the change in ADJCASH going from focused
to diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Similar results may be seen by observing the coefﬁcient of divers-dummy in Regressions 2, 3, and 10, where
the independent variables for complementarities in growth are included.
5. Robustness tests
This section performs a number of robustness tests to conﬁrm the empirical results observed in Section 4. The ﬁrst group of
robustness checks is conducted using different speciﬁcation and regression methods. Instead of using a dummy variable to capture
diversiﬁcation,weuse the number of segments (NSEG) tomeasure thedegree of diversiﬁcation. To control for the potential time-series
correlation of residuals, we also use Fama–Macbeth regressions instead of just ﬁxed effects regressions. More speciﬁcally, industry-
adjusted cash holdings are regressed on ﬁrm structure and other variables in each year. The average of the regression coefﬁcients and
the time-series standard deviation are then used for inference. The results are presented in Table 5. Although we include in the
regressions all the control variables we previously discussed, to save space, we do not present the coefﬁcients for these variables in the
table. That is, Table 5 presents only the results for ﬁrm structure and the variables directly relevant for our three hypotheses.
Consistent with the results from previous regressions where a ﬁrm structure dummy is used, NSEG is signiﬁcantly negatively
related to cash holdings (as shown in Regression 1 of Table 5). Consistent with earlier results, the effect of NSEG disappears when
proxies for complementary growth, asset sales, and inﬂuence costs are included in Regression 2.When Fama–Macbeth regressions
Table 5
Robustness tests with different speciﬁcations, 1988–2006. The table shows regression results from various robustness tests. The dependant variable is the
industry-adjusted cash holdings, which are calculated as cash minus imputed cash, divided by total assets. Imputed cash holdings are the sum of the segment









. In Regressions 1, 2, and 5, ﬁrm structure is represented using the
number of segments in the ﬁrm; in Regression 3 and 4, ﬁrm structure is represented using diversiﬁed dummy. Other controlling variables such as known cash
determinants that are used in Table 4 are also included each regression here but their coefﬁcients are not reported. Regressions 1 and 2 use year ﬁxed effect
regression whereas Regressions 3, 4, and 5 use Fama–Macbeth regression by regressing adjusted cash holdings on ﬁrm structure and other variables in each year
and then report the average of coefﬁcients and t-statistics based on the time-series standard deviation. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate
signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.










MEANQCOR 0.039 0.035 0.038
(7.4)*** (9.50)*** (11.59)***
MSALEPPE −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(−2.24)** (−1.91)* (−1.92)*
MLOSSA 0.008 0.008 0.008
(3.07)*** (3.25)*** (3.26)***
INEFFI −0.074 −0.086 −0.086
(−5.71)*** (−5.03)*** (−5.05)***
Other control variables Included Included Included Included Included
N 59,424 59,816 19 years 19 years 19 years
Adj. R2 32.56% 32.34%
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are used in Regressions 3–5, the results are qualitatively similar: MEANQCOR, MSALEPPE, MLOSSA, and INEFFI are all statistically
signiﬁcant and with the predicted signs. And, both NSEG and divers-dummy are insigniﬁcant once the proxies for complementary
growth, asset sales, and inﬂuence costs are included (Regressions 4 and 5 of Table 5).
The second group of robustness tests is performed on diversiﬁed ﬁrms only. For focused ﬁrms, the variable that measures
internal capital market is always zero and the variable that measures complementarities in growth is always one. Focusing only on
diversiﬁed ﬁrms allows us to better understand how cross-sectional variations in these variables affect cash holdings within this
sub-sample. The results are presented in Table 6. Again, the previously documented control variables are included in all
regressions but are not reported in the table.
The results indicate that NSEG is not statistically signiﬁcant in either the ﬁxed year effects regression or the Fama–Macbeth
regression. The number of segments is irrelevant to the cash holdings for diversiﬁed ﬁrms. In addition, Table 6 ﬁnds similar effects
of MEANQCOR, MLOSSA, SDP, and INEFFI as beforewhere they are all signiﬁcant andwith the predicted signs. However, MSALEPPE
is not statistically signiﬁcant (see Regression 2 of Table 6) when we concentrate only on diversiﬁed ﬁrms. In summary, the results
are largely consistent with the complementary growth and inﬂuence costs hypotheses, where MEANQCOR and INEFFI are
statistically signiﬁcant even in the sub-sample. In contrast, the results for the asset sales hypothesis are less straightforward as
MSALEPPE becomes insigniﬁcant when the sample is restricted to only diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Also, NSEG is not signiﬁcant in any of
these regressions. These results are consistent with the view that diversiﬁed ﬁrms have more choices to sell assets, but their
choices do not increase signiﬁcantlywith the number of segments. For example, ﬁrmswith two segments havemore opportunities
to sell their non-core assets than ﬁrms with just one segment. However, the opportunities do not increase signiﬁcantly when two
segments increase to three or more segments. The results suggest that it is just the availability of any non-core assets to sell when
needed, rather than the availability of increased diversity of assets that matters in this context.
Our last robustness test focuses on an apparent difference in the ﬁndings in our paper and the one in Opler et al. (1999). Using
only data for the year 1994, Opler et al. (1999) test whether diversiﬁed and focused ﬁrms have different levels of optimal cash
holdings. They use the number of segments in a ﬁrm as the explanatory variable but do not ﬁnd any difference in the cash holdings
patterns in the year 1994. The remaining part of this section tries to reconcile their results with ours. One reason for the seeming
inconsistency is that Opler et al. (1999) do not fully control for the industry effects.11 This paper illustrates that cash holdings can
vary widely across industries (as shown in Table 1). Consequently, the industry adjustment for cash holdings at the segment level
is a necessary requirement for reliably estimating the impact of ﬁrm structure on cash holdings. When duplicating Opler et al.'s
(1999) test using unadjusted cash holdings, we obtain results similar to theirs. That is, the number of segments is not a signiﬁcant
cash determinant (shown in Regression 1 of Table 7). However, when we use industry-adjusted cash holdings as our dependant
variable, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant difference in cash holdings across the ﬁrm structures (Regression 2 of Table 7) even in
just 1994 data. Similar results are obtained when the ﬁrm structure dummy variable is used (due to space constraint, this
regression is not reported in Table 7). These results indicate the importance of taking appropriate steps to fully control for industry
effects. More importantly, consistent with our prior results, when we add the proxies for growth complementarities, asset sales,
and agency cost hypotheses in the regression, although only MEANQCOR is statistically signiﬁcant in this “1994 only” sub-sample,
the statistical signiﬁcance of NSEG, the number of segments, disappears (Regression 3).
11 Another reason may be that they focus only on one year, 1994, for this analysis—while our tests include data over a broader period, 1988–2006.
Table 6
Effects of ﬁrm structure on cash holdings for diversiﬁed ﬁrms, 1988–2006. The table shows impact of various organization structure characteristics on cash
holdings for a sub-sample of diversiﬁed ﬁrms only during the period of 1988 to 2006. The dependant variable is the industry-adjusted cash holdings, which are










. Regressions 1 and 2 use ﬁxed year speciﬁcations; Regressions 3 and 4 are the Fama–Macbeth regressions. T-statistics
are reported in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.











NSEG −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003
(−0.88) (−0.83) (−0.64) (−1.40)
Other control variables Included Included Included Included
N 7,147 7,200 19 years 19 years
Adj. R2 9.46% 9.84%
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6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of ﬁrms' organizational structure (i.e., whether a ﬁrm is diversiﬁed or focused) on their cash
holdings. Focusing on organizational structure allows us to explore non-governance related cash determinants, which com-
plements the recent spate of research on the impact of governance mechanisms on cash holdings. There are several reasons why
ﬁrm structure could affect cash holdings. We examine three hypotheses, the complementary growth, asset sales, and inﬂuence cost
hypotheses.
First, in diversiﬁed ﬁrms, since the time-series of investment opportunities for different segments may not be perfectly
correlated, the total cash need for a diversiﬁed ﬁrm may be less volatile over time. If ﬁrms hold cash for potential growth
needs, diversiﬁed ﬁrms would need less to meet the investment need at any one point in time. Additionally, if there is an
active internal capital market within diversiﬁed ﬁrms, the cash ﬂow of one segment is available as capital for another
segment. This reduces the need for external capital thereby reducing a beneﬁt of holding cash. Second, diversiﬁed ﬁrms are
more likely than single-segment ﬁrms to be able to raise funds by selling substantial assets, especially assets of non-core
segments. This reduces the beneﬁts of cash holdings. Hence, ﬁrms with more than one segment should have lower levels of
cash holdings. Finally, agency problems, especially inﬂuence costs that arise from segment-managers' value-dissipating
competition for ﬁrm-wide resources, are more severe among diversiﬁed ﬁrms than single-segment ﬁrms. Thus the marginal
cost of holding cash and liquid assets, which exacerbate the agency costs, are higher for diversiﬁed ﬁrms than for focused
ﬁrms. Hence, we would expect diversiﬁed ﬁrms to hold less cash. All three hypotheses predict that diversiﬁed ﬁrms will have
less cash holdings than their stand-alone counterparts.
Using Compustat ﬁrm level and segment-level data in the 1988–2006 period, we ﬁnd that diversiﬁed ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly
less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different
factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional
robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversiﬁed ﬁrms to complementary growth opportunities
across the different segments of these ﬁrms and the availability of internal capital markets.We ﬁnd that the other theories that rely
on the potentially effective use of asset sales to generate cash, and the increased agency costs in diversiﬁed ﬁrms are not always
Table 7
Effects of ﬁrm structure on cash holdings in year 1994 sample. This table replicates the test conducted in Opler et al. (1999) and shows that seeming differences in
the effects of ﬁrm structure on cash is due to industry speciﬁc effects. Regression results are based on regression of cash holdings using 1994 data. Regression 1 uses
the cash holdings that are not adjusted for the industry at the segment level, which follows Opler et al. (1999). Regressions 2 and 3 use cash holdings that are
adjusted for industry at the segment level, which are calculated as cash minus imputed cash, divided by total assets. Independent variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
Intercepts are included but not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Independent variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Size −0.009 0.003 0.003
(−0.99) (1.81)* (1.82)*
Leverage −1.158 −0.324 −0.323
(−22.78)*** (−31.25)*** (−31.06)***
TobinsQ 0.063 0.018 0.018
(6.79)*** (9.45)*** (8.74)***
R&D 0.239 0.022 0.022
(22.25)*** (9.87)*** (9.85)***
Invest −2.064 −0.367 −0.365
(−13.94)*** (−12.14)*** (−9.81)***
Wcapital −1.121 −0.274 −0.273
(−17.67)*** (−21.15)*** (−21.06)***
Cashﬂow −0.194 −0.055 −0.055
(−2.47)** (−3.41)*** (−3.41)***
Divdum −0.059 −0.045 −0.020
(−1.16) (−4.26)*** (−4.00)***
Bonddum −0.058 −0.021 −0.044
(−2.35)** (−4.08)*** (−4.19)***
Firmsigma 0.251 0.067 0.066
(2.43)** (3.17)*** (3.13)***










N 3,623 3,623 3,623
Adj. R2 41.01% 40.17% 40.17%
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statistically signiﬁcant in robustness tests, and nor are the results economically signiﬁcant in explaining the lower cash holdings
among diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
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